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Abstract 
Over the last two decades, due to strong decentralization and widespread budget constraints, the Italian 
co-payment for health care has become a way to finance public health. This phenomenon has provoked 
a continuous increase of private costs of public health and an evident regional heterogeneity. As a result, 
a pervasive spatial inequality of access to public health care is becoming increasingly clear. The aim of 
this paper is to measure this inequality, mainly determined by the differences among regional co-
payment prices. Access, equity, and needs are all part of the phenomenon ‘inequality of access’, and 
they are difficult to define and measure in health care. For this reason, most of the previously proposed 
measurement methods have inherent limitations and have prompted us to use an innovative approach 
focused exclusively on the supply side. In particular, we focus only on the cost of health benefits (co-
payment). From a methodological perspective, we use a recent new version of the Stochastic 
Multiobjective Acceptability Analysis (SMAA), which is a methodology mainly used to build composite 
indicators of multidimensional phenomena out of the market. In order to deal with the hierarchical 
structure of the Italian health care system, we use the Hierarchy Stochastic Multiobjective Acceptability 
Analysis (HSMAA), which takes into account the uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to 
the considered criteria, as in the standard SMAA, but also the uncertainty with respect to the weights 
assigned to the considered sub-criteria. Applying for the first time HSMAA to measure inequality 
allows us to create a unique index for each region and then to make a classification among them. The 
results show that, since there are different prices for the same health benefits among different regions, 
there are strong spatial inequalities in the cost of the Essential Levels of health care in Italy. 
 
Keywords: Hierarchy Stochastic Multiobjective Acceptability Analysis; HSMAA; Public Health; Equity; 
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 1. Introduction 
Equity in health is a widespread, shared goal in the most industrialized countries [66]. In recent years, 
given accentuated inequalities due to the economic crisis, equity in health has become one of the most 
pervasive priorities, even in the European Union [72]. The general aim stated by policy makers is to 
achieve equitable access to health care across different social groups and to reduce or not to aggravate 
the existing health inequalities.1 There are evidences that the most vulnerable people who most need 
health care do not always receive the care they deserve.2 
Different population groups, such as the poor, elderly, immigrants, people with disabilities, and ethnic 
minorities, may have different health care needs [27]. A health care system should be designed to meet 
the different needs of the population in a fair, efficient, and responsive way [10, 33]. 
Among other concerns, the payment for health care is one of the higher concerns for groups socially 
and economically most vulnerable. For this reason, the health care systems with universal access to 
health care services do not always eliminate health inequalities. Indeed, in many countries with 
universal access to health care, there are still financial barriers, especially for access, and one of these is 
certainly the co-payment [47]. 
Continued growth of public health spending [5, 34, 70] often pushes the debate about co-payment. In 
the context of scarce resources and growing demand for health care, its governance has to combine the 
adequacy of health services and equity of care, with the objective of financial stability. Among the 
instruments rationing the demand side, one of the preferred tools is the co-payment. Indeed, if properly 
applied, the co-payment can fulfil the role of protection and expansion of public health service. 
However, at the same time, if the co-payment is not used well, it can create or increase unequal access 
among users of health care [58]. 
In the specific case of Italy, the co-payment is managed at the regional level. This peculiarity of the 
Italian Health Care Service has transformed the co-payment into a tool to finance public health care. As 
a result, there is strong heterogeneity among the prices for the same public service in different regions, 
which often may lead to spatial inequality of opportunities of access to public health care. For this 
reason, this paper investigates the regional Italian differences in the co-payment prices in order to 
measure the consequent inequality of opportunities in the access of the health care system [18].  
For the first time, this problem has been analysed with a Multi-Criteria Decision Making approach [24, 
32]. From a methodological perspective, we use a recent new development of the Stochastic 
Multiobjective Acceptability Analysis (SMAA) [35, 37]. In order to take into account the hierarchical 
                                                          
1Fundamental policy goal within the EU, as expressed in many European policy documents (Report on health inequalities in 
the European Union, Brussels, September 2013) 
2Among others, this has been reported in the Launch of the World Health Report 2013: Research for universal health 
coverage, World Health Organization, 2013, China. 
structure of the Italian co-payment system, we use the model proposed in Angilella et al. [4], hereafter 
Hierarchy Stochastic Multiobjective Acceptability Analysis (HSMAA). The HSMAA method allows 
taking into account both the uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to the considered criteria 
(as in the standard SMAA) and the uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to the considered 
sub-criteria. This innovative application allows us to estimate a new index of inequality of opportunities 
in public health in absence of information about the real health care needs of people. Our results show 
that, regardless of real needs, there are evidences that differences in the co-payment prices create a 
pervasive territorial segregation among citizens living in different Italian regions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, the economic reasons for co-payment 
and the problem of measuring inequality of access to health services are presented. The third section 
describes the data. The fourth section presents the HSMAA to estimate the equity of access to health 
care, starting from the co-payment data. The fifth section shows the results of the inequality analysis. 
The sixth section contains policy implications. The last section discusses the conclusions and draws the 
main policy advices for the Italian case. 
2. The reasons for co-payment, the issues of health inequality, and the need for a 
multi-criteria approach 
2.1 Co-payment 
As shown in the seminal work of Buchanan [9], the main problem of national health systems is that the 
demand is made by private or individual choices, and supply is a public or a collective choice. On the 
demand side, the individual pushes its demand to the point where its marginal utility is equal to the 
price, i.e., to zero. It follows that the demand from citizens, as patients, tends to be unlimited. On the 
supply side, the community decides the range and quantity of services through political representatives, 
taking into account cost [23]. As the government budget is limited, an unlimited demand of health 
services is not sustainable. 
One of the most applied instruments to rationalize demand is the co-payment. The co-payment allows 
keeping the health service in public supply, in a sustainable way and at a lower price than the free 
market supply. Indeed, empirical evidences have shown that the co-payment restricts the phenomena 
of the moral hazard [52], which leads to over-consumption of health goods and services in the presence 
of the comprehensive insurance coverage [47]. However, the co-payment can be a protection and an 
expansion of the National Health Service, only if it does not constitute a financial barrier to access of 
health care services for low-income groups [31]. 
2.2 The Italian co-payment system 
In Italy, Law no. 537 introduced a comprehensive framework of co-payment in 1993. The first health co-
payment in Italy involved specialist visits and pharmaceutical assistance (prescribed drug services). 
After almost a decade, however, the Finance Act for 2001 abolished the national co-payment. This 
resulted in a big increase in national health expenditure, which forced the government to reintroduce 
the co-payment by Law no. 405/2001, starting from 2002. Different from the previous co-payment 
framework (1993-2001), the co-payment introduced in 2002 was a national tool of regional public 
spending restraint. 
Law no. 405/2001 was a turning point in the use of the co-payment, because since 2002, the regional co-
payment has been used mainly for covering regional health deficits and no longer limiting over-
consumption of health care services. The latter law, in fact, explicitly states that the regions cover any 
management deficits are covered with cost-sharing health spending, including the co-payment. The co-
payment then becomes a tool for making money and contributing to covering the budget deficits of the 
regions [58].  
The Finance Act of 2007 introduced an additional co-payment to the previous specialist visits and a new 
co-payment for emergency services. The first was the ‘super-ticket’, a new private cost only for accessing 
public health facilities for specialized services, and the second was a new co-payment for emergency 
services (white codes).3 The ‘super-ticket’ has been applied since 2011 (D.M. no. 98/2011). 
As a result, there are now three main types of co-payments in Italy: for emergency services, for specialist 
visits, and for prescribed drugs. In the application of co-payments, regions have acted differently. These 
differences, together with the above-mentioned continuous increase of co-payments, provoked a strong 
regional heterogeneity in the private cost of public health. This widespread diversity creates cost 
differences for the same service among different regions [48]. There are evidences that this process 
increases the horizontal income-related inequities in health care [21, 22]. This heterogeneity clearly 
creates a pervasive spatial inequality of access to public health care.  
2.3 Health inequality definitions 
According to the work of Roemer [55], inequalities in outcomes are the result of two sources: inequalities 
due to factors for which people can be held responsible and inequalities due to circumstances beyond 
individual control. The first source may be considered acceptable; the second, however, is unfair. Health 
care is certainly one of the sectors in which individual outcome is strongly related to factors beyond 
individual control. 
There is a large consensus about the relevance of equity in the health sector, but there is little agreement 
on how to measure equity or even how to define what the term means. One of the main reasons for 
increasing attention on this issue is that health inequality systematically increases the segregation of 
people who are already socially disadvantaged.  
As far as the definition is concerned, Braveman and Gruskin [7] define equity in health as the absence 
of disparities, both in health and in its key social determinants, which are associated with social 
advantage/disadvantage. According to Waters [67], an appropriate indicator for estimating equity of 
the health system is access to services. This is the reason why many studies have focused on the equity 
                                                          
3Not in the case of urgent cases, where the patient is in critical condition. 
of access to health care and the consequent inequality [15, 16, 20]. Access can be defined as the use of 
health services conditional to the need for care [67], but while the use of health services can be observed, 
information about personal need is difficult to be extracted. 
2.4 Measuring access 
According to the works of Allin and Mossialos [1] and Lindeboom and Van Doorslaer [40], equity of 
access to health care has been measured in three different ways: equal health outcomes, same utilization 
of health care services for equal needs, and equal access to health care for equal needs. 
In many works, utilization of health care services is considered a good proxy to measure access to health 
care [6, 44]. This approach leads to estimating the production of the health care sector, and the 
consequent inequality in the outcomes is taken as proxy of inequality of access. However, utilization of 
health care is influenced by needs, and needs differ between people. Different population groups, such 
as the poor, seniors, immigrants, the disabled, and ethnic minorities may have different health care 
needs [27]. Consequently, if people in different socioeconomic groups report the same health care use, 
this does not mean that access is equitable. On the contrary, this situation may even be unfair, since 
poor people often need more health care. Therefore, measuring the outcome is not enough to 
understand the equity in access to health care. It is necessary to take into account needs of health care 
services [54]. 
There is no consensus on the definition of needs for health care, but there is a crucial component to the 
needs, which is the individual state of health [46]. The main issue in measuring the state of health is 
data collection. The surveys on health needs are generally based on self-assessments; therefore, they are 
subjective, prone to bias of formulation of the questions and to psychosocial and cultural factors. 
Even when the needs are well defined, comparing needs and utilization leads to the intrinsic problem 
of measuring utilization. Indeed, as in all economic sectors, utilization of health care is influenced by 
both the supply and demand of services. The main problem, in this case, is that demand for health 
services is affected by many exogenous factors, such as: different individuals’ perceptions, different 
information among individuals, and different risk aversions; above all, cultural and religious aspects 
affect the demand for health care [50]. In other words, since some people may refuse treatment for 
various reasons (religious, cultural, different preferences), utilization cannot be used when equity of 
access is evaluated. Equity of access to health care can, therefore, only be defined and measured as equal 
access for equal needs [26, 67]. 
The term access is defined in Mooney [43] as an opportunity and, more specifically, ‘the use of this 
opportunity’. Some authors [69] have defined this as the ability to guarantee a series of health care 
services at a certain quality-level subject to a specified maximum level of personal inconvenience and 
cost while in possession of a specified level of information. Le Grand [39] defines access as costs incurred 
in receiving health care services. The cost must be interpreted in terms of money and time that 
individuals may incur using services. Measuring the cost that individuals may incur using services 
means that there is uncertainty about the real needs and, consequently, the real use of the service. In 
other words, in the inequality of opportunities definition, it is fundamental to consider the ‘veil of 
ignorance’, as proposed by Rawls [53] about health needs.  
2.5 Measuring inequality 
Waters [67] proposes two indicators to measure equity in the distribution of access to health care: (1) a 
modified version of the Gini coefficient, also called a concentration coefficient, and (2) the Atkinson 
distributional measure. These two indicators have been used in three main works [45, 49, 62].   
Morris et al. [45] investigate the inequality in use of GPs, outpatient visits, day cases, and inpatient stays 
in England. From a data perspective, they use a linked data set, which combines information on health 
status and socio-economic circumstances of individuals, with information on local supply conditions. 
They find that utilization of care is linked to income, ethnicity, economic status and education. On 
average, low-income individuals and ethnic minorities tend to have lower use of secondary care and 
higher use of primary care. Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer [62] estimate concentration indices and 
progressivity indices, based on the Kakwani [29] methodology at country level in Europe. Regarding 
direct taxes, they find that Italy is the country with the lowest degree of progressivity. Regarding 
indirect taxes, instead, Italy is one of the few progressive countries. As expected, Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer [62] find that out-of-pocket payments tend to be highly regressive in general. O’Donnell et al. 
[49] provide a systematic practical guide to the measurement of a variety of aspects of health equity. 
One of the most important chapters is dedicated to the concentration index.  
In general, the focus of previous works is one partial inequality indicator, which is eventually used to 
measure the influence of certain individual characteristics (income, socioeconomic status, race, gender) 
on some variables of outcomes [63, 64, 65]. Concentration curves and concentration indices have been 
the workhorses for large and rapidly growing empirical literature on socioeconomic inequalities in 
health care [20]. Such a partial approach has been driven by the technical fact that concentration curves 
and concentration indices are defined in single-dimensioned cases. However, as explained by Giannoni 
and Franzini [21], access is a multidimensional concept. Among others, Klomp and De Haan [30] 
suggest that multidimensionality is intrinsic in the definition of health provided in the Constitution of 
the World Health Organization [71]. Therefore, we propose dealing with inequality in health by means 
of a Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis approach. By linking the concepts of cost from Le Grand [39], 
opportunity from Mooney [43], and uncertainness from Rawls [53], we propose measuring the 
inequality of opportunities by evaluating only the barriers to accessing public health care services. 
Regardless of the unknown real needs and use, we assume that inequality of access to public health care 
is related to cost. Therefore, in our model, the index of inequality of opportunities is given by the sum 
(weighted by the uncertainty) of co-payment prices. From a methodological standpoint, we use the idea 
of Greco et al. [25], where the SMAA approach is used to take into account a large sample of randomly 
extracted vectors of weight to rank regions. Italy is well suited for this measurement, as the level of cost 
(co-payments) varies from region to region. 
 
  
3. The data 
Our analysis is conducted using secondary data collected from four different sources: official website 
of the regions, the National Agency for Health Care Services (AGENAS), the National Federation of 
Pharmacists (FEDERFARMA), and the online newspaper for the Italian health care sector 
(quotidianosanità). These surveys report the value of existing co-payment prices in Italian regions in 
various forms. In this paper, we use this data to estimate the territorial inequality of opportunities to 
access public health in all 21 Italian regions.  
Table 1 indicates the minimum and maximum prices for each co-payment type. The dispersion is quite 
large, as also indicated by the standard deviation. This is the first evidence of heterogeneity in prices 
paid by citizens for the same public health care service in different regions. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics   
Service Min. Max. Average S. Dev. 
Emergency 8 50 26.57 8.62 
Specialist visits 36.15 66.15 48.26 7.85 
Prescribed drugs* 0 8.5 3.08 2.12 
Sources: agenas.it, federfarma.it. Notes: Update to 2015; values in euros; *one prescription and one pack of 
drugs 
 
Regarding prescribed drugs and emergency services, the regions applied co-payment with highly 
differentiated frameworks.  
By analysing the specific cases, the co-payment of emergency emerges as quite homogeneous: almost 
all regions apply 25 euros for the ‘white codes’.4 The higher level of emergency co-payment is in 
Campania and Bozen, with 50-euro cost sharing, while the lower level is in Friuli Venezia Giulia.5 
Regarding the specialist services, the situation is more heterogeneous, mainly because of the ‘super 
ticket’ effect. Nine regions apply the national legislation (Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Molise, Apulia, 
Marche, Lazio, Campania, Calabria, and Sicily). Five regions have modulated cost sharing based on the 
income of citizens (Emilia-Romagna, Abruzzi, Veneto, Tuscany, and Umbria). Two regions have 
modulated the co-payment based on the cost of health care service (Lombardy and Piedmont). Five 
regions do not apply the ‘super-ticket’ (Aosta Valley, Sardinia, Bozen, Basilicata, and Trento apply only 
three euros for super-ticket). The lower level of co-payment for specialist services is in Aosta Valley, 
Abruzzi, Basilicata, and Bozen, with 36.15 euros per visit. Lombardy and Piedmont6 have the highest 
prices, because in these regions, co-payment prices are based on the service price. In those regions, co-
payment can reach 66.15 euros. In the prescribed drug cost sharing, Sardinia, Marche, and Friuli V.G. 
do not apply any co-payment, while in Apulia, it can reach 8.5 euros for one pack of drugs. High cost 
sharing for prescribed drugs can also be found in Lombardy, Piedmont, Veneto, and Tuscany. It is worth 
                                                          
4 Some regions (Calabria, Bozen, and Sardinia) apply co-payment also to ‘justified cases’ called green codes, but we did not 
consider this. 
5 In Friuli V.G., there is a tariff for other specialist services in emergency. 
6For Lombardy and Piedmont, we considered all the possible cost sharing based on the price of services. 
mentioning that Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Abruzzi, Veneto, and Umbria modulate the specialist visits 
and the prescribed drug co-payment based on income. For these regions, in our estimates, we use the 
median regional income from ISTAT [28] in order to estimate the private cost and consequent inequality. 
4. Methodology 
In the Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) problem [24, 32], there is a set of alternatives: 
(1) 𝐴 = {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑚} 
is evaluated on a set of criteria: 
(2) 𝐺 = {𝑔1, … , 𝑔𝑛} 
In this study, we assume that the inequality of access is related to user cost of public health care. Thus, 
our alternatives are the 21 Italian regions, and the criteria are the three categories, with respect to which 
those regions choose the three service co-payment prices: price of emergency service, price of specialist 
services, and price of prescribed drug service.  
Since we consider the inequality of access equal to the user cost of public health care, the index can be 
seen as the sum of the co-payment prices of the services used. In this case, the value function that 
aggregates the user costs is given by the number of times the citizen uses each of the three services, 
multiplied by the relative co-payment price. For each region, 𝑎𝑘 ∈ 𝐴, we can estimate the following 
inequality of access: 
(3) 𝑢(𝑎𝑘 , 𝑤) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑔𝑖(𝑎𝑘)
𝑛
𝑖=1  
where 𝑤𝑖 is the number of times a citizen uses the service i. The problem is that the demand is unknown. 
Therefore, we do not know how many times a citizen will use each service 𝑖.  
If we assume that each citizen uses health care services the same number of times, our inequality of 
access index can be obtained by the simple arithmetic mean where, in (3), we have 𝑤1=𝑤2= 𝑤3= 𝑤𝑖. 
However, in this case, we assume that each citizen has exactly the same number and same kind of health 
problems, and we believe in an abstract and unrealistic ‘representative agent’ consuming health care.   
Our research question is: How does the inequality of access ranking of the regions change when the 
number of times a citizen needs each service is different for each person? In other words, we want to 
know what happens to the ranking when there is uncertainty about health needs as proposed in the 
‘veil of ignorance’ concept introduced by Rawls [53]. 
In the MCDA literature, this question is addressed with the Stochastic Multiobjective Acceptability 
Analysis. Introduced by the seminal work of Lahdelma et al. [35], SMAA is a method able to take into 
account the uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to the considered criteria. After the original 
SMAA, which estimates acceptability index for each alternative measuring volume of weights that give 
each alternative the best ranking position, several modifications to the basic model are proposed in the 
literature. Lahdelma and Salminen [37] introduce SMAA-2, which extends SMAA by considering all 
ranks. Lahdelma et al. [36] develop SMAA-O, which is a method dealing with problems with ordinal 
criteria information. Lahdelma and Salminen [38] propose the combination of SMAA-2 and Data 
Envelopment Analysis [11]. Tervonen and Lahdelma [59] present methods for computations through 
Monte Carlo simulation. Corrente et al. [12] combine SMAA with PROMETHEE methods in order to 
explore the parameters compatible with preference information of the decision maker. Angilella et al. 
[3, 4] combine the Choquet integral with SMAA and obtain robust recommendations and robust ordinal 
regression.  
In order to take into account the uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to the considered 
criteria and to the imprecision of the evaluation completed on considered criteria, SMAA-2 considers 
two probability distributions, 𝑓𝑊(𝑤) and 𝑓𝜒(𝜉) on 𝑊 and 𝜒, respectively, where: 
(4) 𝑾 =  {(𝒘𝟏, . . . , 𝒘𝒏) ∈ 𝑹+
𝒏 , 𝒘𝟏+ . . . +𝒘𝒏 = 𝟏} 
and 𝜒 is the evaluation space, i.e., the space of the value that can be taken by the criteria (co-payment 
prices) 𝑔𝑖 ∈ 𝐺.  
SMAA-2 introduces a ranking function relative to the alternative 𝑎𝑘: 
(5)  𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒌(𝒌, 𝝃, 𝒘) = 𝟏 + ∑ 𝝆(𝒖(𝝃𝒉, 𝒘) > 𝒖(𝝃𝒌, 𝒘))𝒉≠𝒌  
where 𝜌(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒) = 1, and 𝜌(𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒) = 0. 
Then, for each alternative 𝑎𝑘, for each value that can be taken by criteria 𝜉 ∈ 𝜒, and for each rank 𝑟 =
 1, . . . , 𝑙, SMAA-2 computes the set of weights of criteria for which alternative 𝑎𝑘 assumes rank 𝑟: 
(6) 𝑾𝒌
𝒓 (𝝃) = {𝒘 ∈ 𝑾: 𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒌(𝒌, 𝝃, 𝒘) = 𝒓} 
The SMAA-2 evaluation is based on the computation of the rank acceptability index, which is the 
relative measure of the set of weight vectors and evaluations on considered criteria for which the region 
𝑎𝑘 gets rank 𝑟: 
(7) 𝒃𝒌
𝒓 = ∫ 𝒇𝝌(𝝃)𝝃∈𝝌 ∫ 𝒇𝑾(𝒘)𝒘∈𝑾𝒌
𝒓 (𝝃)
𝒅𝒘𝒅𝝃 
where 𝑏𝑘
𝑟 is the probability that alternative 𝑎𝑘 has the 𝑟-th position in the preference ranking. 
As explained in Section 3, some Italian regions modulate the co-payment price on the basis of services 
price. It follows that sometimes there is a differentiation among typology prices of the same service 
(criterion) in the same region (alternative). In other words, in some regions, we have differentiations 
within the criteria, and therefore sub-criteria are introduced. A graphical representation of an example 
of our problem is given in Figure 1. The structure of the problem is hierarchical, because, depending 
on the region, services are sub-divided by different typologies with different associated costs. Since this 
problem cannot be solved with the standard SMAA, a Hierarchy SMAA has been developed for solving 
this particular problem.  
 Figure 1. Problem structure 
 
In the MCDA literature, Saaty [56] first proposed the hierarchical structure of decision problems in the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Thereafter, it appeared also in the Multi-Criteria Hierarchy Process 
(MCHP) of Corrente et al. [14]. Angilella et al. [4] proposed the inclusion of hierarchical structure to 
SMAA, and it extended to ELECTRE III in Corrente et al. [13]. In what follows, we present the 
implementation of the Hierarchy SMAA proposed in Angilella et al. [4] for our health care study.  
In our problem, each criterion (co-payment price) 𝑔𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 is given by the weighted sum of sub-criteria 
𝑞𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑄𝑖: 
(8) 𝒈𝒊 = ∑ 𝒗𝒊𝒋𝒒𝒊𝒋
𝒔
𝒋=𝟏  
In this case, the inequality of access estimated as the user cost of public health care becomes the sum of 
co-payment prices, which are the sum of sub-co-payment prices. The new value function to aggregate 
the evaluations of a region, from 𝐴 with respect to the 𝑔𝑖 co-payments from 𝐺, with respect to the 
typology from 𝑄𝑖, is a double weighted sum. For each region 𝑎𝑘 ∈ 𝐴, we can estimate the following 
inequality of access evaluation: 
(9) 𝒖(𝒂𝒌, 𝒘, 𝒗𝒌) = ∑ 𝒘𝒊 ∑ 𝒗𝒊𝒋𝒒𝒊𝒋
𝒔
𝒋=𝟏 (𝒂𝒌)
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏  
where 𝑤𝑖 is the number of times a citizen uses the service 𝑖, and 𝑣𝑖𝑗  is the number of times a citizen uses 
the specific typology 𝑗.  
In order to consider the hierarchy of this problem, we use HSMAA. This approach allows us to take into 
account: (1) the uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to the criteria (as in the standard 
SMAA) and (2) the uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to the sub-criteria. 
The HSMAA considers three probability distributions: 𝑓𝑊(𝑤), 𝑓𝑉(𝑣); 𝑓𝜒(𝜉) on 𝑊, 𝑉; and 𝜒, respectively, 
where: 
Typology
Service
Region Total Cost
Co-payment 
service 1
Sub-Co-payment 
price 1a
Sub-Co-payment 
price 1b
Co-payment 
service 2
(10) 𝑾 =  {(𝒘𝟏, . . . , 𝒘𝒏) ∈ 𝑹+
𝒏 , 𝒘𝟏+ . . . +𝒘𝒏 = 𝟏} 
 𝑉 = {(𝑣𝑖1, . . . , 𝑣𝑖𝑠) ∈ 𝑅+
𝑠 , 𝑣𝑖1+ . . . +𝑣𝑖𝑠 = 1, 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑛} 
and 𝜒 is the space of the value that can be taken by the sub-criteria 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑄𝑖(𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛) .  
We introduce a ranking function relative to the alternative 𝑎𝑘: 
(11) 𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒌(𝒌, 𝝃, 𝒘, 𝒗) = 𝟏 + ∑ 𝝆(𝒖(𝝃𝒉, 𝒘, 𝒗𝒉) > 𝒖(𝝃𝒌, 𝒘, 𝒗𝒌))𝒉≠𝒌  
where 𝜌(𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒) = 1, and 𝜌(𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒) = 0. 
Then, for each alternative 𝑎𝑘, for each evaluation of alternatives 𝜉 ∈ 𝜒, and for each rank 𝑟 =  1, . . . , 𝑙, 
HSMAA computes the set of weights of criteria for which alternative 𝑎𝑘 assumes rank 𝑟: 
(12) 𝑾𝒌
𝒓 (𝝃, 𝒗) = {𝒘 ∈ 𝑾: 𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒌(𝒌, 𝝃, 𝒘, 𝒗) = 𝒓} 
HSMAA evaluation is based on the computation of the rank acceptability index, which is the relative 
measure of the set of weight vectors and evaluations on considered criteria for which the region 𝑎𝑘 gets 
rank 𝑟: 
(13) 𝒃𝒌
𝒓 = ∫ 𝒇𝑾(𝒘)𝒘∈𝑾𝒌
𝒓 (𝝃) ∫ 𝒇𝝌(𝝃)𝝃∈𝝌 ∫ 𝒇𝑽(𝒗)𝒗∈𝑽 𝒅𝒗𝒅𝝃𝒅𝒘 
𝑏𝑘
𝑟 is the probability that alternative 𝑎𝑘 gets the 𝑟-th position in the preference ranking. 
As Angilella et al. [4] suggest, the rank acceptability indices in (13) can be used to estimate the upward 
and downward cumulative acceptability indices proposed by Angilella et al. [2]. Formally, the 
downward cumulative rank acceptability index for the rank 𝑙 is given by: 
(14) 𝒃𝒌
≤𝒍 = ∑ 𝒃𝒌
𝒔𝒍
𝒔=𝟏  
In words, 𝑏𝑘
≤𝑙 is the frequency that the region 𝑎𝑘 gets a position not greater than 𝑙. With the same 
rationale, the upward cumulative acceptability index for the rank 𝑙 can be estimated as: 
(15) 𝒃𝒌
≥𝒍 = ∑ 𝒃𝒌
𝒔𝒎
𝒔=𝒍  
where 𝑏𝑘
≥𝑙 is the frequency that the region 𝑎𝑘 gets a position greater than 𝑙. 
From a computational perspective, the multidimensional integrals defining the considered index are 
estimated by using Monte Carlo simulations. 
In our application, in absence of information about the demand, we consider uniform probability 
distributions 𝑓𝑊(𝑤) on 𝑊 and 𝑓𝑉(𝑣) on 𝑉, while we do not consider the probability distribution 𝑓𝜒(𝜉), 
because we know the value of the considered criteria. To rank the Italian regions (spatial alternatives), 
we apply the HSMAA technique to 360,000 extractions of 𝑤 and 𝑣 vectors. 
5. Results 
As we have 360,000 extractions and therefore 360,000 rankings, a descriptive statistic gives a general 
understanding. The higher and lower rank (obtained at least on one ranking) and the mode and median 
rank are given in Table 2. Our ranks are in terms of expensiveness of the public health bill. Therefore, 
the higher the rank of the region, the higher the final bill will be for public health users, and the higher 
inequality of access will be. From Table 2, it is clear that Campania is by far the worst place for health 
costs. Indeed, Campania is the only region with its mode and median on the first rank. This means that, 
by taking a uniform distribution of health needs, more than 50 per cent of the time (97 per cent, see 
Table in the appendices), Campania has the most expensive public health bill. The Bozen, Calabria, 
Piedmont, and Lombardy indexes follow the Campania disaster, with certain distance. Indeed, these 
four regions can achieve the first rank, and they have the mode and median above the fourth rank. In 
practice, it means that, with more than 50 per cent of cases, living in those regions results in at least the 
fourth most expensive public health bill. 
On the top of the ranking, Friuli Venezia Giulia has the least expensive public health bill. Then, at some 
distance, Aosta Valley, Abruzzi, and Molise also prove to be cheap in public health care services.  
Bozen and Abruzzi are two interesting cases, because their cost systems can be either the worst or the 
best, depending on the probability of getting a specific health problem. In the Bozen case, this 
phenomenon can be explained by its highest emergency co-payment and its lower specialist co-payment 
price. In the case of Abruzzi, the results are related to the fact that its prices are always close to the 
average price. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistic of the ranking of Inequality of Access in Public Health Care  
Regions Higher Mode Median Lower 
Piedmont 1 3 4 17 
Aosta Valley  9 18 18 19 
Lombardy 1 3 4 18 
Bozen 1 2 3 21 
Trento 16 17 17 20 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 12 21 21 21 
Veneto 1 6 6 9 
Liguria 1 6 6 9 
Emilia-Romagna 9 14 14 15 
Tuscany 1 13 14 14 
Umbria 9 14 14 15 
Marche 8 12 13 20 
Lazio 4 5 6 17 
Abruzzi 1 20 18 21 
Molise 8 11 12 18 
Campania 1 1 1 8 
Apulia 1 10 8 14 
Basilicata 14 19 19 20 
Calabria 1 3 3 11 
Sardinia 6 12 11 19 
Sicily 5 9 8 14 
 
In figure 2, we present a graphical representation of the Ranking Acceptability index of Inequality of 
access in health care. The regions are ranked according to the median acceptability index. It is interesting 
to note that two of the three most accessible regions (Friuli Venezia Giulia and Aosta Valley) are 
Northern regions, while two of the three least accessible (Campania and Calabria) are Southern regions. 
However, Italy has a long history of persistent dualism, North-South, in which the North outperforms 
the South in economic performances and well-being, a phenomenon well known as ‘questione 
meridionale’ [25, 42, 57, 61]; our results show that this dualism does not involve the public health 
expenditure.  
 Figure 2. Rank acceptability indices by median 
 
Figure 3 shows a map of the regional probability in the three highest (left part of Figure 3) and in the 
three lowest (right part of Figure 3) rank positions, according to the sum of the bills of public health 
expenditure. Technically, in Figure 3, we report the downward (14) and upward (15) rank acceptability 
indices [2, 4] for the 3rd and 18th rank, respectively.  
Looking at the left side, it emerges that the higher probabilities are in the big Northern and Southern 
regions, while the central regions and the Islands have less probability of being the top three most 
expensive regions. The North–South divide, which is striking in the ranking based on per capita GDP, 
is not present in terms of public health expenditure. In addition, it emerges that the smallest regions (in 
particular Aosta Valley, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Molise, and Basilicata) are better for keeping the price of 
public health low compared with the biggest regions (Campania, Lombardy, and Piedmont). 
Considering that Patrizii and Resce [51] found that the smallest regions outperform the big ones in terms 
of efficiency of health care in Italy, the low cost of public health care services in the smallest regions may 
be due to their lower costs of production.  
 
 
Figure 3. Probability of being in the Highest (left) and Lowest (right) three rank positions7 
 
To summarize, the results make clear that, since there are different prices for the same public health 
benefits among different regions, there are strong spatial inequalities in the cost of the Essential Levels 
of health care in Italy. Regardless of real needs of health care, differences in the co-payment prices create 
a pervasive territorial segregation among citizens living in different Italian regions. This is a paradox in 
a country with a National Public Health System [17]. 
 
6. Policy implications 
From a policy perspective, our results suggest taking into account the regional disparities when 
decisions are made in public health care decentralization. Moreover, our results clearly show the 
damages provoked when the co-payment becomes a tool to finance public health as an alternative to 
                                                          
7 The Trentino Alto Adige values are estimated based on the Trento and Bozen average. 
general contributions. National Health Service (NHS) is a system of the welfare state, which aims for 
the same standard health care of the citizens of a country, wherever they live. In Italy, profound 
interregional differences in health care expenditure may aggravate the already-existing inequalities 
among regions [21, 48]. The main problem is that, since 2002, regional co-payment revenues are used to 
finance spending. This is proven by the fact that regions with financial stability plans have higher co-
payment prices (see Piedmont, Lazio, Campania, and Calabria for specialist visits). One of the most 
controversial parts of the Italian co-payment is definitely the ‘super-ticket’, introduced in 2007 – the 
tariff that serves as a ticket to the NHS. The ‘super-ticket’ has the stated objective of improving the 
economic and financial equilibrium of the regions, but it creates three serious health problems: (1) the 
outflow of some benefits from the public system; (2) the renunciation of expensive care for a part of the 
population; and (3) a paradoxical decline in public revenue. Referring to the last point, the ‘super ticket’ 
raises the cost of some performances beyond their value, creating distorting effects on consumer choices 
for which it might be cheaper to pay the full price of the private market.  
From a distributional perspective, the worst situation lies in regions where co-payment prices are 
modulated according to the service value. In these cases, market mechanisms are introduced in a sector 
where market failure is the reason for justifying public intervention. One of the major consequences is 
that a part of the population renounces more expansive health care, endangering the universality of 
health care. 
The reason for the co-payment is to empower users regarding the cost of healthcare. The Italian system 
fails in this objective. In addition, the tariffs applied in some regions are likely to violate the universality 
principle of the National Health Service laid down in Article 32 of the Italian Constitution, accentuating 
the risk of serious inequalities in accessing the essential levels of assistance. 
To restore a coherent sharing scheme in Italy, the ticket should return to its original role in reducing 
over-consumption. It is therefore necessary to remove from the regions the perverse incentive to use co-
payment as an alternative to taxes: a solution might be to disconnect co-payment revenue from 
financing health expenditure.   
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the regional differences in the application of the co-payment in the Italian National 
Health Care Service. In particular, it measures the inequality of opportunities in accessing public health 
care among the regions, due to the difference in co-payment prices. 
Following the previous literature focused on inequality of opportunities in health care service, we 
propose measuring the inequality of access to public health care through the cost of services, regardless 
of unknown health needs and use. In our study, the index of inequality is given by the sum (weighted 
by the uncertainty) of the co-payment prices. From a methodological perspective, we use the Hierarchy 
Stochastic Multiobjective Acceptability Analysis. This new modification of the standard SMAA allows 
dealing with Multi-Criteria Decision Making problems with a hierarchical structure, as in the case of 
the Italian health care co-payment system. In our case, HSMAA measures the inequality, allowing us to 
create a unique index for each region and then rank them. Indeed, by aggregating the data of prices of 
public health care services with HSMAA, we estimate a new index of inequality of opportunities in 
public health care.  
Our results show that, under the ‘veil of ignorance’ about health needs, the Campania (a Southern 
region) is by far the worst region. On the contrary, we found that Friuli Venezia Giulia (a Northern 
region) has the cheapest public health care. These evidences make clear that Italy, with these 
circumstances, will never have a convergence path, either in economic performances in well-being or in 
civil rights. Indeed, the price of access to public health changes within the country, region by region. 
This paradox causes a territorial inequality of access in the same country, even if there is a National 
Public Health System. Such difference has been described as a ‘postcode lottery’ that contributes to 
social and spatial disparities, because people’s access to public services is determined by the postcode 
area in which they live [60]. These differences should not exist, since the Italian Constitution provides 
the right for the Essential Levels of Care in equal measure on all national territories. 
As further research, this paper proves that many problems related to the public sector can be studied 
with the Multi-Criteria Decision Making approach. More generally, public economics science needs 
tools to manage the multidimensionality of the phenomena in a holistic approach. For instance, the way 
HSMAA manages the uncertainty can help with deeply understanding the complexity of social 
phenomena, which are the most relevant components in the market/government relationship path. 
Policymakers dealing with collective choices need tools to manage the multidimensionality of 
phenomena and the heterogeneity of individual preferences. A plurality of individuals with different 
preferences can be replaced by means of a plurality of vectors of weights. The HSMAA approach 
explicitly takes into account this issue, considering the whole space of feasible weight vectors. This 
feature makes HSMAA a valid support for better-informed decision and policy formulation.   
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 Appendice 
Rank acceptability indices 
Rank PI AO LO BO TR FR VE LI EM TU UM MA LA AB MO CA AP BA CA SA SI 
1 4% 0% 7% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 97% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 
2 16% 0% 18% 48% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 0% 34% 0% 0% 
3 24% 0% 25% 9% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 37% 0% 0% 
4 22% 0% 20% 8% 0% 0% 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 9% 0% 0% 
5 13% 0% 12% 4% 0% 0% 21% 21% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 14% 0% 3% 0% 7% 
6 6% 0% 5% 2% 0% 0% 28% 28% 0% 1% 0% 0% 18% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 1% 2% 20% 
7 3% 0% 3% 1% 0% 0% 28% 28% 0% 10% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 4% 5% 15% 
8 1% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 15% 15% 0% 5% 0% 0% 9% 4% 0% 0% 2% 0% 3% 2% 16% 
9 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 6% 6% 0% 12% 0% 0% 17% 1% 5% 0% 5% 0% 9% 5% 21% 
10 1% 0% 1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 13% 4% 0% 6% 4% 19% 0% 19% 0% 0% 17% 12% 
11 1% 0% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 10% 7% 8% 4% 1% 23% 0% 18% 0% 0% 25% 5% 
12 1% 2% 1% 2% 0% 4% 0% 0% 3% 9% 3% 37% 1% 3% 23% 0% 3% 0% 0% 20% 0% 
13 1% 4% 0% 3% 0% 3% 0% 0% 11% 39% 11% 27% 1% 1% 14% 0% 3% 0% 0% 3% 1% 
14 3% 2% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 74% 0% 74% 0% 2% 0% 5% 0% 3% 0% 0% 1% 2% 
15 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 4% 0% 0% 5% 0% 8% 0% 
16 3% 1% 4% 2% 24% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 1% 21% 2% 0% 0% 6% 0% 3% 0% 
17 0% 14% 2% 4% 43% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 1% 15% 2% 0% 0% 1% 0% 3% 0% 
18 0% 51% 1% 2% 22% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 5% 3% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0% 
19 0% 19% 0% 1% 10% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 59% 0% 8% 0% 
20 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 32% 0% 0% 0% 24% 0% 0% 0% 
21 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 75% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Notes: PI=Piedmont; AO=Aosta Valley; LO=Lombardy; BO=Bozen; TR=Trento; FR=Friuli Venezia Giulia; VE=Veneto; LI=Liguria; EM=Emilia-Romagna; TU=Tuscany; 
UM=Umbria; MA=Marche; LA=Lazio; AB=Abruzzi; MO=Molise; CA=Campania; AP=Apulia; BA=Basilicata; CL=Calabria; SA=Sardinia; SI=Sicily. 
 
